Before there was GPS, people still needed to sail the oceans of the world and know precisely where they were.
With a sextent, you could figure out your latitude, but not your longtitude. Enter the Longitude Rewards, a British government program to encourage someone – anyone – to find a accurate way to determine longitude.
GNSS is the collective term for “global navigation satellite systems“, of which the common GPS system is one. Russia and China are known to operate their own GNSS systems, alongside the GPS system developed by the US military.
The activities of the FSO – (in which it is apparent that false signals are deliberately broadcast to confuse GPS receivers, such as those you might have in your car, or those found in commercial ships or commercial aircraft) – are reputedly designed to keep attack drones away from Russian president, Vladimir Putin.
While this might seem like a not unreasonable use of such techniques, the report presents evidence that they are also using these techniques in Syria, possibly to confuse enemy military systems. There is of course a long running military conflict in the region.
It is therefore logical to assume that such techniques can and have been used all over the world at some time – past, present and future.
These techniques could be used to disrupt navigation in all sorts of transportation systems and infrastructures.
Russia shot down a Korean Air passenger jet in 1983 after an issue with the configuration of the navigation system on that Boeing 747. While this was found to be the fault of the pilots at the time, faulty navigation data could be used to initiate similar incidents, but with plausible deniability.
Quoting the report’s Executive Summary:
In this report, we present findings from a year-long investigation ending in November 2018 on an emerging subset of EW activity: the ability to mimic, or “spoof,” legitimate GNSS signals in order to manipulate PNT data. Using publicly available data and commercial technologies, we detect and analyze patterns of GNSS spoofing in the Russian Federation, Crimea, and Syria that demonstrate the Russian Federation is growing a comparative advantage in the targeted use and development of GNSS spoofing capabilities to achieve tactical and strategic objectives at home and abroad. We profile different use cases of current Russian state activity to trace the activity back to basing locations and systems in use.
In this age of “fake news” and “native ads”, people are not critical enough about the information presented to them. They end up believing what they want to believe.
How do we tackle this? How do we teach our children to recognise this phenomenon? How do we give them the tools to understand and review information for themselves, lest “fake news” becomes a scourge for all time?
There are many fine examples of journalism in the world today, but we unfortunately live in an age where “fake news” and the selective acceptance or non-acceptance of “facts” is prevalent.
As such, for consumers of news, understanding what is really happening in the world today can be confusing.
Not to mention, misleading.
The downing by Soviet fighter jets of Korean Air Lines Flight 007 in 1983 was a tragic, yet fascinating story of tragedy and international politics, spanning more than a decade.
Here is a fabulous piece presenting an insight into how the beginning of this story was covered. This is reflective of just the San Francisco area at the time – at a time when journalists really were journalists.
On a lovely sunny day in Melbourne, here’s a shot taken at Essendon Fields while having lunch with my daughter. Looking at the old Essendon Airport terminal building, back from when Essendon was Melbourne’s main airport.
Like many a nerd, not only do I love computers and computing, I also love space exploration.
Today I present a magnificent combination of the two, as a group of what can only be described as massive enthusiasts, work at getting an actual Apollo Guidance Computer – (which hasn’t been powered up in around 50 years) – up and running, and executing actual NASA Apollo code.
While this particular unit was never flown into space – (it is understood to be serial number 14, which was used in LTA-8) – it is basically an almost flight-ready prototype.
The HG659 is an extremely popular modem with ISPs, because it is an extremely versatile modem. It supports both ADSL and VDSL connections, and FTTP connections. For this reason it is widely deployed in Australia as part of the “multi-technology mix” hodge-podge Malcolm Turnbull turned the NBN into for political reasons, rather than for technology reasons.
Australian ISPs using the HG659 therefore only have to stock one type of modem, and you as the end user just plug it into whatever NBN technology is serving your premises, and the modem self-configures to suit.
A great number of Australian ISPs use it – (and brand it with their own logos) – see a selection below:
ISPs in other countries also use it:
The use of the HG659 modem is widespread worldwide – including in jurisdictions where the lawmakers are seeking to ban the use of Huawei equipment in telecommunications systems, such as Australia and the United States.
I’ve even read of instances where one Australian ISP appears to have an active backdoor into their private customer’s networks, using the custom firmware in their supplied HG659 modems.
But why ban Huawei in the implementation of 5G networks, but happily welcome them into other significant network infrastructure?
One might argue that having a footprint inside millions of homes is a bigger concern than having them in mobile phone towers – (which can be and are actively monitored by the carriers operating them, and suspicious activity might be detected) – as the vast majority of home users get the modem from their ISP, plug it into the wall and never think about it again.
Monitoring? Yeah, right.
I think the politicians are clearly – (as is often the case) – trying to make a political point without having any real understanding of what they are talking about.
Huawei may or may not present information or national security issues, but if you’re going to take a stand against them, you cannot and should not be so selective.
Ban them or don’t ban them – but just don’t half-ass your decision.