NBN – Infrastructure Services Agreement

In the next instalment of my series on the recently signed Telstra/NBN Co deal, I will highlight what I believe are the interesting and/or important parts of the third of the eight individual agreements – the Infrastructure Services Agreement (ISA).

All descriptions are taken from the Telstra release to the ASX.

As a summary, the ISA as described is:

“The ISA contains the detailed terms for the long-term provision of access to three types of infrastructure and related service by Telstra to NBN Co: dark fibre links, rack spaces in exchanges, ducts and associated duct infrastructure (pits and manholes). Telstra retains property in all the infrastructure except for those Lead in Conduits (“LICs”) used by NBN Co, which become NBN Co’s property once used.”

The ISA is a relatively straightforward agreement in comparison to the SA, but also has some interesting points that reflect on the length of time the ramifications of the whole deal apply for.

For instance, the term under which NBN Co leases access to Telstra’s “pit and pipe” infrastructure is already slated to run for up to 60 years from the commencement date. This is defined by an initial term of 35 to 40 years, after which NBN Co has two 10 year options to extend the leasing arrangement.

The “35 to 40 year” variable aspect of the initial term is due to “a number of factors including NBN Co’s rollout schedule – this says to me that NBN Co and Telstra have agreed that there is a five year leeway on the expected construction timetable.

This is a little bit of a concern – (that so much leeway is in there) – but since the successful conclusion of this entire deal should actually take time pressures off the rollout, this is more than likely a “worst case scenario” issue, rather than any real expectation or fear that it will take five years longer than planned.

Certainly something to keep an eye on – though this is most likely consideration for major natural disasters holding up the rollout.

This agreement also provides for NBN Co to access much of Telstra’s existing infrastructure for the purposes of building this network. Namely, access to existing dark fibre assets, rack space within existing telephone exchanges, the physical “pit and pipe” running up and down just about every street in the country, and the “Lead in Conduits” (LICs) running from the pits and into premises to carry the copper inside.

For dark fibre access, Telstra retains responsibility for the upkeep and agreed service levels of such links. Similarly, Telstra is responsible for maintenance/general upkeep of the exchange facilities being used by NBN Co.

Telstra gives NBN Co the right to occupy their “pit and pipe”, and must also continue to maintain that infrastructure. In each case, Telstra is responsible for any remediation work required to bring any of these facilities up to “fit for purpose” standards for NBN Co to use under the terms of the agreement.

The LICs are treated slightly differently than the other infrastruture mentioned above, with Telstra having no responsibility for the remediation or required service levels from them. This is because at such time that NBN Co provisions a fibre connection from the pit to a premises, NBN Co takes over ownership of the LIC.

Indeed, in the process of rolling out the fibre connections, the existing piece of copper will in most cases be used to pull the fibre through from the pit to the premises being connected.

This alone will be a massive time – (and therefore, cost) – saving exercise in rolling out the fibre. In return, NBN Co must make the LIC available for use by Telstra at no cost, to maintain premises access for their underground HFC network.

Network rollout schedules also play a part in the ISA, with NBN Co retaining full discretion over the timing of when the rollout passes through particular regions and past particular premises.

Telstra is obliged to make available to NBN Co, all necessary Telstra-owned infrastructure to complete the rollout in a given region to NBN Co’s timetable.

In particular, this relates to the transit backbone of the NBN – with this expected to be completed by the end of 2014 – with only “force majeure” being cause for the slippage of this date.

Telstra is also obliged to not dispose of any of the infrastructure specified within the agreements with the knowledge and consent of NBN Co. This is to prevent Telstra from offloading infrastructure NBN Co has earmarked for use in the build of the network, to a third-party with whom NBN Co might then need to negotiate with to access that infrastructure as planned.

As with the SA, there are some fairly standard performance – (fault repair times, etc) – and early termination clauses, including allowing the 35 to 40 year infrastructure lease to continue on completed parts of the NBN, should the network not reach the full 93% rollout. This would allow continuation of services for premises where the rollout was completed, if it actually stopped completely.

Much like the SA does for mainly competitive issues in regards for Telstra in the coming NBN world, the ISA delivers a certainty to infrastructure access issues to make sure that the NBN can be built as closely as possible to the intended schedule.

Site Power Works

Just a quick update for regular readers – there will be some unexpected power remediation works at one location where part of this site is hosted this afternoon, so there will be a short period of degraded service. The site will be up, but there will be errors in the right hand column of the pages.

It should hopefully only be for a few minutes when it happens – so everything will be back to 100% after a short break.

The exact time is not known at this stage.

NBN – Subscriber Agreement

In the second instalment of my series on the recently signed Telstra/NBN Co deal, I will highlight what I believe are the interesting and/or important parts of the second of the eight individual agreements – the Subscriber Agreement (SA).

All descriptions are taken from the Telstra release to the ASX.

As a summary, the SA as described is:

“The SA deals with the disconnection by Telstra of copper-based Customer Access Network services and broadband services on its HFC cable network (but not Pay TV services on the HFC) that are provided to premises in the NBN fibre footprint as the NBN is rolled out, and the maintenance of the parties’ structural and network alignment during that process.”

Firstly, taking a look at just this initial description, the clear indication is that subscription television services – (such as the part-Telstra-owned Foxtel) – will continue to be delivered, as far as described in these documents, over the existing Telstra HFC network in areas where that network is deployed.

This should kill this argument from some quarters that Telstra are being paid to shut down their HFC network – this is simply not true.

To quote directly from the media release:

“The disconnection obligations in relation to the Telstra HFC cable broadband network do not require Telstra to stop the use of the Telstra HFC cable for the supply of Pay TV services (such as by Foxtel).”

Certainly, internet services will be removed from the cable network – but this should be considered a win for consumers, as more bandwidth for more channels and/or better bit rates – (meaning better picture quality) – would then be available for those Foxtel subscribers connected via the HFC network.

It should also now be clear from the base description of the SA, that Telstra’s commitment to the disconnection of the copper network encompasses only that network within the 93% NBN fibre footprint.

If you’re in the 94% to 97% areas, you’ll have the choice of the NBN wireless component, or any existing copper-based services. If you’re in the 98% to 100% areas, you’ll have the choice of the NBN satellite component, or any existing copper-based services.

Reading further down the agreement, we come to an important declaration of when existing copper-based services are disconnected in individual areas.

As the network is rolled out, it has been agreed that as each “region” – (defined as approximately 3,000 premises) – has its fibre rollout completed, Telstra will disconnect copper services and any HFC-based broadband services to that region no later than 18 months after a declaration from NBN Co that the rollout is completed in that region.

What that could mean for many people is that even if you don’t use Telstra as your existing copper-based ADSL broadband supplier, your ISP would have up to (but not necessarily) 18 months to onboard themselves with the NBN, or they may lose you to another ISP who is NBN-ready.

All ISPs will need to be aware of the fibre rollout schedule, and in which of the defined regions each of their customers exist – after which they must make sure that they are NBN-ready in that region before Telstra yanks the copper network(s) in that region.

Some people and ISPs might get caught out here – so this will be one to watch.

Now we get down to some of the serious restrictions placed on Telstra, that has earned them this entire $11b deal in the first place.

Under the agreement, Telstra must not use the existing Copper Access Network (CAN) or their HFC cable to provide fixed line services to any premise, except in limited specific circumstances.

They must also not allow anyone else to do so using these existing networks, and as such Telstra have been limited in their ability to dispose of those assets. This of course locks the NBN fibre into all premises as the primary premises access infrastructure.

Presuming ACCC and Telstra shareholder approval, that’s it. Done, kaput, no more copper.

On the question of the “limited specific circumstances” in which connections are allowed to be made using the CAN or the HFC network, this can only be done on a temporary basis due to “material NBN unavailability”, and only for a specified period of time, presumably until the NBN again becomes available in that circumstance.

Telstra may only permanently reconnect subscribers using their networks if NBN Co becomes insolvent, or permanently ceases operation.

Fairly clear cut that these agreements effectively rule Telstra out of the wholesale fixed line market – as expected and already understood.

Now comes the really interesting stuff!

Telstra must – (for its retail sales) – exclusively use the NBN fixed fibre as the fixed line connection to premises for a period of twenty years – again with a few specific exclusions, such as connections between Telstra network elements, and similar. Assuming the deals reach the commencement date – (after Telstra shareholder approval) – Telstra is committed to using the NBN fibre for this period of time for all fixed line connections.

Full stop.

Femtocells provided by Telstra must also be connected to the network via the NBN fibre.

Moving on – Telstra – (also for a period of twenty years from the commencement date) – must not promote wireless services as a substitute for fibre based services. This does not mean they cannot promote wireless services, but as I understand it, must only deliver premises-based services using the NBN fibre.

Telstra also cannot build its own Passive Optical Network (PON) infrastructure as the primary premises access means – also for a period of twenty years from the commencement date.

See what eleven billion dollars gets you?

Basically, at least twenty years of being the default – (and in most cases, the only) – means of access to premises in the so-called last mile. This is the last-mile monopoly that Telstra has enjoyed since the Postmaster General’s Department rolled out the CAN in the 1950’s. The PMG eventually became Telecom Australia, and then of course Telstra.

Full circle.

The $11b that Telstra receives is partly accounted for in this agreement, with a payment they receive for each and every premise that is disconnected from the copper or HFC network – and they can also be compensated if the NBN ceases the rollout which would see these ongoing disconnection payments cease.

They would be paid on a sliding scale from $500m in the event of the fibre rollout reaches 20% of the planned 93% fibre footprint – (to save you the maths, that’s about 21% coverage) – down to zero, naturally, if the 93% coverage target is met by NBN Co. In the event that the rollout does not reach that 21% mark, Telstra would receive no compensation for a cessation of the NBN rollout.

Finally, there are also fairly standard termination rights regarding the cease of trade or insolvency of either party to the agreement.

Overall, the SA is most interesting to say the very least – with a clear statement of intent from Telstra that they completely agree to get out of the wholesale fixed line market, and that they don’t have the right to use any infrastructure that remains – (for the most part, the HFC network) – to provide retail fixed line services.

I, like many others, thought such a time might never come. It seems however, that hell might just be about to become frozen over.

Why I Dumped Telstra

About a year ago, Telstra – (along with Optus and iPrimus) – agreed to “voluntarily” apply a version of the government’s mandatory internet filter to the connections of all of their customers.

They agreed to “voluntarily” filter out at least a certain subset – (mainly child pornography) – of the ACMA blacklist, the complete contents of which is the basis of the mandatory filter plan.

The problem is, while Telstra, Optus, and iPrimus have “voluntarily” agreed to apply this reduced version of the government’s filter, the customers of these ISPs have not been given any “voluntary” rights as to whether or not their connection(s) come under this “voluntary” plan.

It is not “voluntary”.

Now, to be perfectly clear, nobody with a right mind – (myself included) – would ever condone/support the production and/or dissemination of child pornography on the internet or elsewhere.

The problem with the internet filtering plan – whether “voluntary” or “mandatory” – is that it is only designed to block requests to an identified list of websites.

The bottom line is that this kind of material is generally not spread on websites – there is ample evidence that the sick puppies sharing this stuff around are doing it through email, via file sharing networks, and newsgroups – and over encrypted channels too.

The style of filter being applied does not restrict these distribution methods even in the slightest – and almost moronically, the government has said that there will be no penalty for bypassing the filter.

So why do it?

The methods the sickos use to get access to this kind of material don’t leave log files around for people to check. The internet traffic flows they create are not definitive evidence that they are accessing this kind of material, and the filter does nothing to prevent them from accessing it.

But the real problem is not the distribution of child pornography. A JPEG image or an MPEG movie in and of itself does not hurt anyone. It is the content that has hurt someone – the children in it.

If you waved a magic wand, and magically every electronically stored piece of child pornography in the world disappeared, that would be great. If a month later someone was able to obtain some online means only one thing.

Somewhere in the world, sometime in that month, a child has been abused by someone – mentally, emotionally, physically, and sexually – and it was captured for distribution. It is the production that must stop. You can’t stop child pornography by trying to hide it. You have to stop it from being produced. And the internet filter doesn’t even hide it – it might only blur it a little bit.

There have been countless prosecutions in regards to online child pornography of late:

I could go on, but do you notice the pattern? These cretins are being identified and prosecuted. The SOURCE of this rubbish is being identified, and children are being rescued.

All without an internet filter.

A filter would force these people further underground, and make their detection even harder – making it harder to rescue these kids from peril. A filter could actually further entrench the child pornography trade, and condemn more children to such abuse.

That should be the focus. The children.

Until January this year, I had been a loyal Telstra mobile customer since 1996 – almost fifteen years. I’ve never had any problems with their service – it has always been reliable, and in the advent of mobile broadband, their coverage and throughput is second to none.

It is interesting to note that Australia’s two biggest ISPs – (Telstra and Optus) – have more to gain than any other ISPs from a participation deal with the upcoming National Broadband Network.

Is implementing the “voluntary” filter a requirement for those deals to be made? Telstra is gaining $11b, and Optus is gaining $800m through their NBN deals.

I still believe that the filter is ultimately doomed, but this is food for thought.

The bottom line is that they have now taken sides with a plan that is useless and unwarranted, and had I still been with Telstra – I would have no choice to opt-out of their filtering.

Once you start on the path of censorship, and the mechanisms are in place, freedom of speech and democracy take a hit.

Bit by bit, the powers that be will identify more and more content as worthy of “protecting” us from, and one day it will go too far – and it will be much harder to rectify than it was to implement.

I cannot and will not be a party to that, and that is why I left Telstra.

NBN – Implementation and Interpretation Deed

In the first of a series of articles on the Telstra/NBN Co deal signed today, I will highlight what I believe are the interesting and/or important parts of the first of eight agreements signed – the Implementation and Interpretation Deed (IID).

All descriptions are taken from the Telstra release to the ASX.

As a summary, the IID as described is:

“[The IID] documents the Conditions Precedent (i.e. actions that must be completed and conditions that must be satisfied or waived before the transaction is required to be fully implemented) and various interim arrangements and is effective immediately. It also contains common provisions which are incorporated into the SA, ISA, and AD.”

The first interesting point on this one is the discussion entitled “Termination”, in which is has been agreed that if any of the Conditions Precedent (CP) are not satisfied or waived by 5.00pm on 20 December 2011 – (unless varied by prior agreement) – the IID is automatically terminated.

The CPs themselves relate to some already known and expected conditions of the deal between Telstra and NBN Co going ahead – such as ACCC approval of the deal, acceptance by the shareholders of both Telstra and NBN Co, and a number of others – such as the customer migration plans, and taxation rulings in regards to the deal as a whole.

You can of course read the full list in the ASX release.

What this discussion means overall is that if all the pre-conditions for Telstra’s participation in the NBN are not met by the 20th of December, 2011 – the IID becomes invalid, and terms for any continued deal(s) between the two would likely need to be renegotiated.

It does not necessarily mean the end of the road for any Telstra participation – but it would slow things down dramatically. The biggest hurdle is likely to be ACCC approval and possibly Telstra shareholder approval.

I doubt that any of the parties haven’t been particularly careful not to put controversial provisions into the agreements, so even the ACCC process will probably go smoothly – but time will tell.

The next interesting item for me is entitled “Illegality and Change of Law”, in which some avenues a different government might use to try and shut the project down are possibly “headed off at the pass”.

It states that “if performance of any terms of the SA, the ISA, or the AD becomes illegal, the IID contains a process under which these documents can be varied to make performance legal”.

Now, I would never claim to be a lawyer, but the way I read that is that if any aspect of the intended work, or the way in which that work is carried out is made illegal – (say, through a legislative change) – there is some scope to work around that change.

As an (extreme) example, lets say that a new government decreed by legislation that it is “illegal for Telstra or NBN Co to lay optical fibre”, there exists in the agreement instruments through which it may – (or may not) – be possible to make the continuing rollout legal once again.

I wouldn’t be surprised if such aspects to agreements are common, but it is interesting that potential law changes are catered for.

The agreement also notes that the current NBN-enabling legislation allows for the sale of NBN Co into private hands after the completion of the network, and that Telstra may terminate the SA, the ISA, and the AD if “there is a change in control of NBN Co which results in a provider of retail telecommunications services in Australia controlling 15% or more of NBN Co, except where that provider only has a small market share”.

It seems clear that the intention at this stage is that no large telcos may own more of a privatised NBN Co than 15% – possibly/probably designed to prevent a company like Optus getting in control of the company. Presumably, Telstra would be similarly limited.

So – that’s it for now. The IID isn’t a lot more than a “head” document to tie the next three agreements between Telstra and NBN Co together – and they are where the interesting bits come in.

Stay tuned for the next installment!

The NBN Deal – What Just Got Signed?

Obviously one of the hottest topics today has been the announcement of binding agreement between Telstra and NBN Co for the former’s participation in the forthcoming National Broadband Network.

There was also a similar agreement announced between Optus and NBN Co.

But what actually got signed?

In actual fact, it is a series of “eight separate but interdependent documents”, signed by at least two of NBN Co, Telstra, and the government, enabling the network to be constructed in a more timely and effective manner, and eliminating unnecessary expenditure on infrastructure that already exists as a Telstra asset.

From the Telstra release to the ASX, the deals signed between NBN Co and Telstra are:

Between Telstra and the government, the signed deals are:

Over the next few days, I’ll be taking the summaries of each agreement as released today, and discussing the most interesting and/or important aspects of them, based on what we know so far.

I’ll start right now with the Implementation and Interpretation Deed (IID) – and I’ll update this page with links over time as I release more articles on the other agreements.

Enjoy the read!

Telstra / NBN Agreement Signed

It was announced this morning that Telstra have signed the long-awaited deal for their participation in the National Broadband Network (NBN), and its rollout.

Below is the full media release to the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX):

Full Telstra Media Release to the ASX

I’ll be absorbing the deal throughout the day – (I’m actually away on a client site for a fair chunk of the day) – and will share my thoughts as they materialise!

UPDATE: Optus have also confirmed the signing of a similar deal with NBN Co, full media release to ASX here:

Optus Media Release to the ASX

Big day!

More Stumbles For Internet Filter

In recent days we have seen more bumbling and stumbling from the government in regards to its proposed mandatory internet filtering plan, further suggesting that it might just be on the outer from the government’s policy agenda.

Last week, it became clear that without fanfare, the branch of the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy (DBCDE) with the job of administering and developing the policy, had been quietly closed down.

Whilst the government publicity machine insisted that this didn’t mean the policy was cancelled or was in the process of being cancelled, clearly the importance of the “project” had been watered down.

Now we have seen that the Joint Select Committee on Cyber Safety (JSCC) in its latest report has played down the need for the policy to be implemented:

“We have found no evidence that the relevant websites, these large multinational websites, are reluctant to take this sort of material down. Their user policies are actually very broad in terms of the kinds of materials they can take down compared to, for example, what is covered in the Broadcasting Services Act. They cover a much wider range of material that they describe as inappropriate than is described in legislation. So the breadth of the policies is broader, and we have not seen any evidence of a reluctance on their part to take it down.”

Of most concern to the government and its plans for the filter is the change of the numbers in the Senate from July 1st, when the Australian Greens take up the balance of power.

The Greens went to the last election with a clear position against the policy. The Coalition opposition also held that policy position before the election.

Assuming no change in policy from either party – (which may or may not be the case) – the ascension of the Greens to the balance of power in the Senate means the government would likely need to do a deal with either the Greens or the Coalition to reverse their position, to get enough votes to pass any filtering legislation.

At this stage, there has been no indication of such a change from either political party.

One must remember that even Stephen Conroy himself admitted that he didn’t believe the filter could be brought in outside of any parliamentary process:

“Genuinely, I don’t believe we can, I don’t think there’s a backdoor way we could do it. I think the only way we could do it is through Parliament.”

I always qualify my articles on the filter with the “never say never” mantra, but unfavourable numbers in the Senate and a continual erosion of the basis for the policy makes it look more and more unlikely to ever come into being.

We cannot give up the fight against this policy – but there is some light at the end of the tunnel.

Can The Coalition Stop The NBN?

A lot of people are asking of the NBN, whether or not the Coalition would be able to halt the project, should they win the next federal election – which is still over two years away, should it not be called early.

The simplest answer is “yes” – of course they could. Regardless of the status of any in place contracts when they came to office, as the government all they would have to do to “stop” the project is pass a piece of legislation to halt the flow of funds from the treasury, and that’s that.

The project would stop.

However, it might be the consequences of doing so that keeps the project alive – whether that be in its current, or a modified form.

Telstra On Track For Landmark NBN Deal

“Some involved in the project say by the start of 2012, if the project is still being built, the costs to unwind it will be too high and unlikely to be paid.”

Now, I don’t know if that’s true, but it would certainly not surprise me. Consider Victoria’s yet-to-be-completed desalination plant near Wonthaggi, where taxpayers face an ongoing $20b expense, even if they do not buy any of the water it (will provide).

There are a number of interesting quotes from the desalination plant article:

“Figures compiled by PriceWaterhouseCoopers for the Coalition government show the plant will cost as much as $23.9bn in nominal terms over the next 30 years if the maximum annual amount of 150 gigalitres is bought by the state’s water authority.”

If no water is bought from the plant’s owners and operators, Aquasure, the state will still have to pay $19.37bn for “annual service” payments in nominal terms over the same period.”

“Mr Baillieu said the state was stuck “with a very expensive white elephant” because breaking the contract with Aquasure would cost billions of dollars in legal fees and the sovereign risk for the government would be too high.”

Despite the clichéd use of the “white elephant” tag, there is a clear history with government contracts of “special” deals, locking payments in despite potential changes in policy and/or government.

While there is no definite indication of exactly what financial penalties an incoming Coalition government might face for halting – (or even modifying) – the NBN, it seems inevitable that clauses in the about-to-be-finalised agreement between Telstra and NBN Co could amount to billions in contract pay-outs, should indeed the project come to a premature end.

And the project already has made a lot of contractual commitments.

NBN Co & Silcar Reach Agreement to Deliver Value-for-Money Fibre Rollout

“NBN Co has now executed over 100 tenders with a total potential value of approximately $7 billion.”

Given that the Silcar contract above covers construction only in Queensland and New South Wales, and NBN Co are negotiating with other companies for main network construction in other states, as well as the MDU builds currently out to tender, contractual commitments are expected to top $30b very soon.

Paying out the monies owed could get very very expensive for anyone wishing to halt the NBN project. It might cost just as much to halt it, than it would to complete it.

Spend $36b to receive very little, or $36b to receive a world class telecommunications network?

It might just be here to stay, whether you’re a supporter or not.

NBN Just Got Easier For Small ISPs

In light of recent comments from Internode managing director Simon Hackett, in which he questioned the ability of the AVC/CVC pricing mix to allow for smaller ISPs to compete on a national level under the NBN, comes news today that Nextgen Networks are planning to deliver a wholesale product that would eliminate his concerns for any ISP adopting their solution.

Nextgen Offers RSPs One-stop-shop for NBN Customer Access

One of Hackett’s main concerns was that the high number of “Points-of-Interconnect” (POI), currently slated to be 121 in the ACCC-approved model, rather than the 14 POI model he and NBN Co were initially in favour of, would place unnecessary financial burden on ISPs – particularly the small ones – when connecting backhaul to each POI.

The smallest ISPs, he feared, would never be able to compete on a national level, with the cost of providing backhaul to 121 locations obviously being far greater than the costs of providing backhaul to 14 locations.

While this is certainly a valid point of view with considerable merit, when looked at from the other direction, I don’t believe that it is quite so clear cut.

The NBN is designed to cover approximately 12 million premises by the time it is completed in about 2020. A solution based on 121 POIs means about 100,000 premises (on average) need to be covered by each POI. Under the 14 POI model, approximately 850,000 premises need to be covered by each POI.

To cover every premise in the country, the debate gets down to one of more backhaul links with lower capacity requirements, or less backhaul links with higher capacity requirements – an interesting conundrum which in my opinion, has no truly right or wrong answer.

The main reason the ACCC went for the higher number was to protect existing infrastructure from being “stranded” and unusable within the NBN as a whole.

The less POIs you have, the more likely that a single existing link is nowhere near any of them, and that it becomes useless – destroying the investment the owners of that link have made in establishing it.

Fair enough that that is largely protected.

I have stated in the past that I think 121 POIs is too many, and that 14 is too few, and that I believe a “better” number is 66 – (the total number of call collection areas within our current network infrastructure) – and which should closely match existing assets.

Nevertheless, 121 is the number we have.

The concern was that small ISPs wishing to compete on a national or even regional level, wouldn’t have the financial capacity to do so, given the costs of getting the backhaul up and happening.

What Nextgen have done today is eliminate that concern, with their “NBN Connect” product seeking to address the problem by choosing to wholesale access to the entire NBN – (through all 121 POIs) – through as little as a single connection into the Nextgen network.

Small ISPs can access as much of the network as they require through that single connection, through what is effectively a single “POI”.

The backhaul question is gone.

Yes, the small ISPs will still need to pay for access based on volume and how many POIs they want to access, but they won’t be struck with the cost of setting up and maintaining 121 – (or indeed any) – backhaul links – relying instead on existing infrastructure Nextgen has in place.

It will be an economy of scale that will be very attractive – and not just to the really small players in the market. Some of the mid-size ISPs may see it as a cheaper, less headache-prone path towards NBN connectivity as well, with Nextgen taking care of the “hard part”.

This is the sort of market shift that the government was hoping to stimulate in the new telecommunications landscape in this country – and Nextgen are the first to throw their hand up with a solution.

They shouldn’t be the last.